The following paper was published by The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2003) of the United States in February 2003 Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption Gu Guoliang Deputy Director and Research Fellow Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Asymmetric warfare is defined by strategists as conflict deviating from the norms, in which a potential opponent -- a state, a "transnational" group (such as an international terrorist organization or a drug cartel), or various other types of players -- seeks to counter the superior technology or firepower of a superpower or regional power with unconventional "asymmetric" means. Wars primarily fought by nation-states with balanced, conventional fighting capabilities are being replaced by surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare.1 While the U.S. national security strategy correctly defines the threat of asymmetric warfare launched by terrorist groups as “today’s most urgent threat” to the United States, President Bush’s strategy of preemption is not the solution to the problem; in practice, it won’t work and in principle, it breaks all existing rules. Rather, preemption only diminishes the role of diplomatic cooperation and nonproliferation regimes, weakening their effectiveness against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It Won’t Work Preemption is not a new strategy. What is new is President Bush’s emphasis on this strategy since September 11 and its emergence as the nameplate for U.S. national security strategy. In a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Nashville on August 26, 2002, Vice President Cheney cited Israel's June 7, 1981 attacks on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility near Baghdad as an example of the ability of preemptive strikes to set back Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions.2 But the strategy of preemption is a risky option that can backfire. Politically, a government needs a legal basis and moral grounds to support preemptive attacks; technically, it needs reliable intelligence about the rival nation’s capabilities and intent as well as assurances that attacks on the targets will be accurate. Otherwise, the consequence of violating other countries’ sovereignty and hurting innocent people will be significant. Beyond these practical concerns, other historical examples show that the strategy of preemption has empirically proven ineffective at preventing or deterring either WMD use or even WMD capability acquisition in the first place. Can’t Prevent WMD Use In 1994, the Clinton administration threatened to launch preemptive strikes against North Korea but refrained because it feared serious consequences. In mid-June, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution urging President Clinton to take action to prepare U.S. troops “to deter and, if necessary, repel an attack from North Korea.”3 Defense Secretary William Perry asked General John M. Shalikashvili to prepare a contingency plan for a preemptive strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities to be included in the Operation Plan 5027 which was a U.S. plan for defeating a North Korean attack. 4 Both Pentagon officials feared, however, that such an attack would incite the North Koreans to launch a military attack on South Korea; even though North Korea would surely lose any subsequent war, war between the North and the South would kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, before it was over. According to Secretary Perry, the two sides were on the brink of a war that might involve weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, through the mediation of former President Jimmy Carter, the governments of North and the United States began to negotiate and finally signed the Agreed Framework in Geneva on October 21, 1994, a pact that "drew the region back from the brink of conflict."5 Can’t Prevent WMD Proliferation The strategy of preemption also cannot prevent the so-called rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction in the first place. Although President Bush rhetorically dubbed Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “axis of evil,” in practice the administration has taken different approaches in dealing with these countries. While planning to launch preemptive strikes against Iraq, the United States is not planning any risky attacks against North Korea and Iran, although the U.S. government suspects and has even provided evidence that North Korea and Iran are developing weapons of mass destruction. 　　At a November 2002 briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington, D.C., James Kelly, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told reporters that President Bush had “made clear that we have no intention or plans to attack or invade North Korea.”6 One U.S. official told me during his recent trip to Beijing that the United States fears the possibility of North Korea's heavy artillery attacks against South Korea more than it fears North Korea's use of weapons of mass destruction, because the potential of artillery attacks is more realistic and serious.7 In the case of Iran, the Bush administration does not seem to have come up with an established policy to deal with that government’s developing a WMD capability. 　　Although preemption may be the theoretical basis for U.S. attacks against Iraq, the goal of potential U.S. preemptive attacks against Iraq is unclear. Is the objective to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction or to change the country’s regime? The Bush administration has changed statements about its goal several times. On the one hand, the White House recognizes that it should use force only as a last resort. Its National Security Strategy states clearly that " The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression."8 On the other hand, the Bush administration is preparing for a war against Iraq, with or without the mandate of the United Nations. It is an open question if the coming war against Iraq will once for all prohibit the nation from developing weapons of mass destruction in the future. 　　Moreover, preemption is not the answer to the war on terror precisely because it cannot eliminate all nonstate terrorists. Neither the superior military power of the United States nor its preemptive strikes can deter terrorist groups from launching suicide attacks. The former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen once warned that "American military superiority actually increases the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically."9 A ballistic missile defense cannot prevent an attack on the United States. Preemption cannot keep terrorist groups from using trucks, container ships, civilian airliners, private planes, and subway cars to attack the United States anywhere they choose. With the military operation in Afghanistan at an end and Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders still at large, how can use of the strategy of preemption help the United States to wipe out terrorist groups in the near future? It Breaks All the Rules While preemption is ineffective in deterring or preempting terrorists or states attempting to acquire or use WMD, it undermines existing strategies to combat WMD cooperatively. A national security strategy of preemption poses a serious challenge to the existing tenets of international law and to the framework of the United Nations—the single institution founded with the objective of collectively maintaining world peace. Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."10 Under international law, the United States is entitled to attack Iraq only as an act of self -defense without Security Council approval. According to the definition of self-defense proposed by the U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1837 and universally accepted since, "There must be a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."11 Thus far, although Iraq has not fully complied with the UN resolutions, no imminent military threat to the United States has been detected. Therefore, the United States can not legitimately attack Iraq. 　　Furthermore, the UN Charter Article 33 clearly stipulates that international disputes should be handled through peaceful means.12 Not only is the very definition of what justifies a preemptive strike at stake, but also, who has the right to make that judgement. Even the European nations—longtime U.S. allies—consider preemption “as a sign of a permanent break by the United States from the international system . . . and as the assertion of supremacy unburdened by international laws or institutions . . .”13 No country is entitled to deprive the United Nations of its right to judge whether or not a war is justified. The international community as a whole, therefore, cannot accept preemption as the national security strategy of one single nation. Otherwise, any single nation may become the judge and jury of international law. Catalyzing a Chain Reaction Adopting a preemptive strategy sets a bad example for other governments and could have a seriously negative global impact. If the U.S. example were to be followed, Israel could launch preemptive attacks against Palestine or other Arab countries, and India and Pakistan could launch preemptive strikes against each other. By acting on its goal of eliminating the supposed threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, therefore, the United States would increase the potential for more military conflicts, making the world even more insecure and unstable. 　　Moreover, if the United States were to use missiles or tactical nuclear weapons to strike the deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities in its preemptive attacks against rogue states or terrorist organizations, on what moral grounds could the U.S. government justify prohibiting other nations from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction? Such action would only demonstrate the power afforded by weapons of mass destruction and, therefore, further inspire others to acquire them. An old Chinese adage says, "Do not unto others as you would not have them do unto you." From Mutual to Unilateral Assured Destruction Traditional arms control theory aims to avoid and decrease the danger of preemptive attacks and war between major powers through negotiations and arms regulation. But this notion should also apply to relations between major powers and small powers. President Bush’s new emphasis on preemption does not abandon deterrence but, instead, attempts to change its nature. His administration has simply replaced mutual assured destruction with unilateral assured destruction. 　　In his May 1 speech at the National Defense University, President Bush made it clear that “Cold War deterrence is no longer enough… Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.”14 The Bush administration has shifted the target of deterrence from Russia to rogue states and nonstate terrorist groups, stating that “today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles, in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life."15 Thus, the Bush administration has extended the implications of deterrence strategy from deterring others from using WMD to attack the United States, to deterring others from acquiring WMD in the first place. 　　Finally, preemption reflects the Bush administration’s penchant for unilateralism. President Bush has made it clear that the United States "will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists.”16 Since Bush assumed the presidency, his administration has taken a number of unilateral steps to remove the United States from international arms control and nonproliferation regimes. President Bush announced U.S. formal withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on December 13, 2001, stating, “I have concluded that the ABM Treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks.”17 The Bush administration has shelved the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the U.S. Department of Defense’s Nuclear Posture Review has stated that "The DOD and DOE will reassess the need to resume nuclear testing and will make recommendations to the President." 18 It has also refused to comply with the protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention. These unilateral steps taken by the U.S. government not only weaken some of the arms control and nonproliferation regimes it has worked to help establish but also blatantly contradicts its own goal of stemming WMD proliferation. A Better Alternative: Getting Everyone on Board the Same Plan International terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global problems; only the global community as a whole can effectively act to resolve them. Achieving that solution is only possible through redefining cooperative security and bolstering the existing international arms control regime—not writing it off. Redefine Cooperative Security At the outset, it is essential to address the root causes of WMD proliferation, meaning that nations’ incentives to acquire, distribute, and use weapons of mass destruction must be eliminated. That Brazil, South Africa, and other nations have voluntarily forfeited their nuclear capabilities proves that if a nation feels it has no need for nuclear capability and feels secure with the security guarantee provided by the international system such as negative and positive security assurance, then WMD proliferation can be contained.] The U.S. national security strategy report rightly acknowledges the need to address the causal factors by noting the importance of “diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism.”19 But effectively diminishing those conditions requires redefining cooperative security—to feature mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality, and cooperation—so that it yields greater benefits to all nations. 　　To help establish and maintain a stable international order where people of all nations can live free from the kind of poverty, disparity, discrimination, and resentment that so often yields terrorist activity and the pursuit of WMD proliferation, a credible guarantee of security should be provided to those countries that have given up their aspirations to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 　　Nations that have already developed nuclear capabilities should continue the process of nuclear disarmament and make a commitment not to resume nuclear testing, use, thus maintaining the credible bargain made with non-nuclear states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 　　The nuclear-weapon-states should give unconditional security assurance to the non-nuclear-weapon states. The existing positive and negative security assurances, as expressed in the P-5 declarations are not enough.20 The Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, should negotiate an international legally binding instrument that will assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 　　 Treaties of nuclear weapon-free zones such as Antarctica Treaty, Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of Rarotonga, Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty), Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) should be fully implemented. 　　The United States, as the world's only superpower, plays the leading role in maintaining world peace and order, and holds the key to the solution of many issues including the issue of counterproliferation of WMD. 　　The United States took the initiative on November 28, 1991 by adopting the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, better known as the "Nunn-Lugar CTR program", authorizing DOD to provide financial and technical assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus directed toward the safe and secure transportation and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.21 On May 23, 1992, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol with the United States, in which Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine committed themselves to join NPT as nom-nuclear-weapon states. They formally joined NPT before the end of 1994 and accomplished the process of transporting all their strategic nuclear warheads to Russia before the end of 1996.22 　　In the case of North Korea, for example, if the United States were willing to sign a mutual nonaggression and security agreement and give North Korea a credible guarantee of security and survival, North Korea would be ready to give up its nuclear and missile programs.23 North Korea and [the United States] should fully implement the Agreed Framework signed in 1994 and resume negotiations on issues dealing with both nuclear weapons and missile defense. It is doubtful whether the United States can achieve its narrow goal of solving the issue of North Korea's nuclear and missile program without addressing the broader issue of a general improvement of political relations between the two countries. What North Korea wants is not just economic aid or commercial bargain, but political and security guarantees which the Bush administration is not ready to offer. Only through peaceful negotiation and returning to a political atmosphere when tensions are low, as they were in late ‘90s in Korea, can the issue of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs be effectively handled with the cooperation of South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and other countries. Build on—Don’t Write Off—Nonproliferation Agreements Currently, most countries—including Iraq, North Korea, and Iran—have acceded to the NPT, Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and other arms control and nonproliferation treaties. The existing international nonproliferation regime has been effective and should be enhanced, not weakened in light of today’s threats. Although today’s headlines are driven by the absence of inspectors in Iraq since 1998, significant positive steps had been taken after the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991, demanding that Iraq eliminate unconditionally its weapons of mass destruction under international supervision. After more than 400 UN inspections over seven years, according to a UN assessment in 1998, “the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programs has been eliminated” by the inspections regime.24 　　The first half of the 1990s clearly witnessed significant achievements in the field of arms control and nonproliferation: the CWC was concluded in November 1992; the NPT was indefinitely extended in May 1995 at the UN’s NPT Review Conference, and the CTBT was concluded in September 1996. But when the Republican-dominated U.S. Congress refused to ratify the CTBT in October 1999 and Re accelerated the pace of the development of a ballistic missile defense program in January 1999, all momentum was brought to a halt. After the Bush administration came to office, its apparent belief that arms control and nonproliferation regimes inhibit U.S. power has thus further contributed to the failure of global nonproliferation efforts. Military build-up, missile defense program and preemption have become the key components of the Bush administration's national security strategy. U.S. military build-up and its ambitious ballistic missile program have had some negative impact on world strategic balance and international arms control and nonproliferation regime. Other countries began to lose faith in international nonproliferation regime. Moreover, American actions may incite the aspirations of other countries to acquire or modernize WMD. 　　The international community cannot afford to lose confidence in international nonproliferation regimes, treaties, and agreements because of recent failures to enforce these regimes. The fact shows that current enforcement efforts through UN have borne results and UN inspectors are carrying out their inspections in Iraq under UN mandate. The United States should take the lead in setting a good example in enforcing and abiding by international arms control and nonproliferation treaties—and not just as the justification for preemptive strikes. 　　Furthermore, national governments cannot choose to adhere to the NPT but neglect nuclear disarmament and the CTBT regimes. The NPT requires that nuclear states also fulfill their obligations toward disarmament. Article VI of NPT stipulates that "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measure relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."25. The fact that the Bush administration continues to put off ratification of the CTBT and plans to develop tactical nuclear weapons only provides greater reason for currently non-nuclear states to seek weapons of mass destruction. 　　Under the framework and guidance of the United Nations, the existing international nonproliferation regime—including the NPT, BWC, CWC, and CTBT—should be enforced with improved verification and full compliance. The export control system and verification regime should also be enhanced. The existing institutions such as Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Good and Technologies have played positive roles in preventing proliferation of WMD. Nevertheless, their roles are limited by their limited membership. It is essential to have the universally participated nonproliferation regimes so that those who violate the norms of the regime can be effectively punished. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a global problem and one of the greatest dangers that all nations will face in the twenty-first century. Therefore, it is not a problem that the United States can solve on its own—especially, with threats of preemptive attacks. Rather, international cooperation—particularly among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—is essential for dealing effectively with this issue. 　　Cooperative measures designed to prevent nuclear materials—including plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, and nuclear technology—from falling into the hands of terrorists have produced a positive outcome. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has produced positive results in dismantling the WMD and their materials in the CIS countries after the disintegration of the Soviet Union26. The cooperation of the international community in freezing the assets of the terrorist groups and sharing intelligence about terrorist groups have contributed to the success of international campaign to fight against international terrorism. Besides, an universally accepted nonproliferation regimes would be more effective against those nonstate actors. When all the countries, not just a few countries, are committed to the nonproliferation treaties or regimes, nonstate actors would lose their bases for political, financial and logistical support. Without the base and backing of a state, nonstate terrorist organizations will find it very difficult to get the materials or technologies needed to develop weapons of mass destruction. Conclusion Preemption reflects the Bush administration’s perception of a changed threat facing the United States and is an extension of the U.S. government’s unilateral policy—this strategy proceeds entirely from the security interests of the United States. It implies that, with the end of the Cold War, because “the United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world,” 27 the U.S. government is now entitled to do whatever it sees fit in pursuit of its own national interests. The United States seeks to establish a new international order, guided by U.S. interests and values. But the world is diverse, composed of countries with distinct systems, religions, and cultures. Instead, the United States should work with other powers to address this threat, heightened in everyone’s eyes after the tragic attacks on September 11, cooperatively. 1 David I. Grange: Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concerns, National Strategy Forum Review, Winter 2000. 2 Ray McGovern, “The Origin of Bush’s Preemptive Attack Strategy,” The Hill, September 18, 2002. 3 Amendment to S. 2201 (FAA Authorization Act) offered by Senator Robert Dole, Senator John McCain et al., Congressional Record, vol. 140, part 9, June 16, 1994, pp. 13278-13292. 4 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry: Preventive Defense, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C. 1999, p128. 5 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C. 1999, p. 132. 6 U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, “Kelly Says No Final Decision on Status of N. Korea Agreed Framework,” Washington File, November 20, 2002. 7 Personal interview, Beijing, November 25, 2002. 8 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p15. 9 Center for Defense Information, "Military Domination or Constructive Leadership?", Defense Monitor, 27(3)(1998), p.8. 10 The U.N. Charter, www.un.org/ 11 Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton of August 6, 1842, set forth in Moore, John Bassett, A Digest of International Law, Vol. II (1906) p412. 12 The U.N. Charter, www.un.org/ 13 Tomas Valasek, “The U.S. National Security Strategy: A View from Europe,” Center for Defense Information, Brussels, www.cdi.org/, October 9, 2002. 14 President George W. Bush, Speech at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov. 15 Ibid. 16 Todd Haskins, Preemptive Doctrine, www.mypoliticaltake.com, 2002. 17 The White House, President Bush's remarks, December 13, 2001. 18 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, 8 January 2002, p55. 19 The White House, The National Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p . 20 United Nations Security Council Resolution 984, 11 April 1995, www.nti.org/. 21 Graham t. Allison, Owen R. Cote,Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, Steven E. Miller: Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1994, p4. 22 Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. Mcdonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, p29. 23 Leon V. Sigal: North Korea is no Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating Strategy, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Research Council, December 23, 2002, http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0227A_siga.html. 24 Daryl G. Kimball, “Prevention, Not Preemption,” Arms Control Today, October 2002. P2. 25 Jozef Goldblat: Arms Control, A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 1994, p343. 26 The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat (CTR) program overview, NIIS nuclear profile database, March 1999. 27 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p6.