The Models of Power Shifts: An Explanation for the Cycle of Ups-and-Downs in Sino-US Relations Keywords: Power Shift, US China Policy, Sino-US Relations, decision-making Abstract: The author tries to build an explanatory model for the cycle of ups-and-downs in Sino-US Relations by analyzing the factors, mechanisms and processes in the decision-making. She then examines the legitimacy and limitations of this model through appraising the influences of both presidential power shift and Congressional power shift on US China policy in the past 30 years. She concludes that the cycle of Sino-US relations will still probably parallel with the cycle of American power shift in the future if we hold the international factors and Chinese factors constant. Brief Biography: Dr. Zhang Liping is a research fellow and deputy chief of political section at the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Her research interests cover American party politics, presidential elections, interest group politics, American political thoughts, decision-making process, the US grand strategy and US China policy. Business Address：Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Dongyuan, No. 3 Zhang Zizhong lu Beijing 100007, PRC Email Address: Zhanglp_Helen@yahoo.com, zhlp@cass.org.cn Tele： (086)(010) 64015645 (O) Fax: (086)(010)64000021 Mobile phone: (086)(010)1351621038 （begins） A phenomenon is widely noticed that there have always been a cycle of ups and down in the Sino-US Relations, paralleling with the cycle of presidential power shift. From being sworn in the White House to the farewell of any president, it is witnessed that Sino-US relations shifted from the frictions and tensions worsening at the beginning to the problem-solving and relationship-stablizing to the relations-moving forward. I want to argue that this phenomenon has begun not since post-cold war period but since Nixon’s era. And I hold that the power shift includes not only presidential shift but also Congressional shift. Now that either power shift takes place after the election cycle, it is characterized by the cycling, big shift every four years and mild shift every two years. Power shift means the executive authority and legislative authority change from one party to another party or from one person to another person. In this paper I try to explain the widely acknowledged phenomenon through a model of power shift. I will take into account the legitimacy and limitations of the model through appraising the influences of both presidential and Congressional power shifts on US China policy in the past 30 years. Factors, Mechanisms and Processes of US China policy Generally Speaking, the factors influencing US China policy ought include international items (international framework and international situations), Chinese causes (national power, political and social situations, economic development and the military power of China), American variants (the role of the U.S. in the world, domestic politics, economic situations, social thoughts, media an public opinion) and etc. The formula is: P (t) = I (I1+I2)+C (C1+C2+C3+C4) +A (A1+A2+A3+A4) +O (O1+O2+O3). P (t) represents US China Policy during some particular period. I1 and I2 represent the international factors. C and its series represent the Chinese causes. O represents other factors. The specialist and scholars have increasing acknowledge that the domestic politics is the most obvious factor in the making of US China policy . If we look from the angle of American domestic politics, presidential politics, Congressional politics, party politics, interest groups politics, bureaucratic politics and inter-branch politics are related to power shift directly and indirectly. What I am exploring is how the power shifts have an impact on US China Policy, holding other factors constant or unchanged. Now that US China Policy is an integral part of US foreign Policy, it is necessary to explain the decision mechanism and decision-making process of foreign policy firstly. From the level of organization, the decision mechanism can be explained through the organizational model or bureaucratic politics model . It can be explained through the political process model . It can further be explained with psychological model . From institutional angle, there are two different decision-making process: president-centered White House decision-making and Congressman-centered Congressional decision-making. In the former process, three basic forces are put in the decision-making: presidential advisors (professional advisors, secretaries of departments, staff advisors of White House and outside advisors), presidential politics (public opinion, public interests, interest groups, Congress, press) and presidential perspectives (the authority of president, resources, time, commitment and information) . Traditionally, Department of State has taken charge of American foreign policy, but it has changed since the end of 60s in the twenty century because of the different of nomination and confirmation between the advisors and staff at White House and the secretaries of departments, the distance between them and the president, and the expansion of the executive power. The phenomenon is the power of advisors is rising and the influences of secretaries are decreasing . In regard to the foreign decision-making, the Department of State’s status has been declining and the National Security Council’s status has been rising . The President is still the final man to decide. But when it is concerned with some concrete foreign policy, whichever department or whoever has leverage depends on the personality and political style of the president . Different president has different inclinations resulting in the shift of the gravity of decision-making process. As one of the insider of the inner circle of Kennedy administration, Theodore Sorensen said, “White House decision-making is not a science but an art.” Congressman-centered Congressional decision-making is characterized with diversity and variety due to the autonomy and relatively independence. Each member in Congress wants to act as a Secretary of State. Say that there are “535” Secretaries of State. James Barber also separates the political styles of the members of Congress into four types according to the degree of legislative participation: positive legislator ( problem-solving and policy-oriented member, a highly-educated successful lawyer from competitive district), positive bystanders (satisfied with the respect and approval form others, from less competitive district), negative propagandist (disappointed and uneasy not well-known lawyer, minding the attraction of the eyeballs more than the substance of policy, coming from competitive district), negative reluctant member (respected old man locally, nominated from less competitive district) 。Generally speaking, the members ’ voicing in foreign affairs mostly belongs to the kind of “political performance” for the purpose of “opinion effect” so that they can escape the blame and pressures from their voters. Majority members are neither interested in foreign issues nor have time and energy devoting to the foreign affairs that are not much helpful in their reelections. Hence, in Congressional decision-making, interest groups sometimes play an important role. The lobbyists of the interest groups concerned offer the filtered information or ever the original draft of the members’ resolutions or bills. The lobbyists often present themselves to the hearings of the committees or subcommittees for the testimony or conduct grassroots campaign to influence the outcome of the policy. Between the two decision-making processes, which is more important? According to the Constitution, president and Congress should share the power in foreign policy. Practically, the president has more say than Congress, particularly during the wartime or the era of cold war. No wonder distinguished political scientist Robert Dahl suggest, the relationship between the executive branch and legislative branch is “ the president initiates, Congress chooses”, and “in many and important foreign decision-making, Congress has few opportunities to decide the choice.” James Robinson finds, in foreign decision-making, what Congress does is to legitimize the suggestions of executive . Aron Wildavsky puts it that the presidency is the twin: one for domestic policy, yielded by the domestic pressures, one for foreign policy, caring more on the defense and foreign affairs . Franz Bax argues that foreign policy decision-making is a process of the interplay between two branches, in which the differences of each branch can be fully expressed and both have to compromise . Some scholar recently insists that the role of Congress in foreign decision-making mainly lies in the appropriations for the international commitment that America shoulders and blocks the nominations of president in confirmation process. “ Congress, in foreign policy, can be like a bee at a picnic—buzzing around, getting into everything, momentarily messing up well (or poorly) laid plans, and otherwise creating an annoyance for the executive. But Congress ultimately has shown itself unlikely to fundamentally change the course of events on all but a few occasions.” In a word, White House process is still the center in the foreign policy making, supplemented by the Congressional process. However, from the end of cold war to the 11/September, the president was checked increasingly in foreign policy making by the Congress . Despite of these facts, I will argue that the Congressional decision-making almost parallels with the White House decision-making in the case of US China policy making. I tend to use the power shift model to explain the decision-making process and behavior. This model hypothesizes that the cycle of US China policy is in relations to the cycle of power shift. Among the factors concerned with decision- making, the President, Congress and interest groups are influenced directly or indirectly by the power shift except the relative independence of the press and public opinion. The Presidential Power Shift: A Periodic variant in US China Policy The power shift is divided into two sorts: first, power shift taking place among the same political party; second, the power shift taking place from one party to another party, that is to say, the power alternating from Republican president to Democratic president or from Democratic president to Republican president. Theoretically, the first sort should not exert great influences on the policy because the presidents from the same party should share similar political philosophy and have common policy goals. And the second one should cause a severe policy adjustment because the presidents from different parties differ in political ideals and issue stands. The severe differences may probably come from electoral politics. The reality is far from simple. Even the first power shift will bring out the different policy because of the psychic of presidential term and the personality of the presidents. Ever since 1972, the first kind of power shift took place twice. And they did in the Republican Party, and only once did through the formal procedure. In 1989, George H. Bush took power from Reagan after he defeated the Democratic candidate Dukakis. The political styles of Regan and Bush are very different. Regan belongs to the kind of delegator whereas Bush belongs to the kind of administrator. In US China policy making, Reagan walked between the advisors such as White House Chief of Staff James Baker and Donald Regan, vice president George H. Bush) and secretaries between departments (such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig/George Shultz) ，but George H. Bush acted as his own Secretary of State. He desired to discuss China policy with Secretary of State James Baker and NSC advisor Brent Scowcroft, but in China policy making, almost all initiatives coming form himself . From the output of China policy, Reagan’s China policy appeared tough and aggressive, comparing with Bush’s steel hand covering with velvet glove. The second kind of power shift brings about the following results: (1) Different philosophy results in the change of the agenda and the policy tools. Security issue rises to the top after the Republican replacing Democrat whereas human rights issues climbs to the No. 1 after the Democrat taking over the power from the Republican; (2) the sequel of electoral politics resulted from the power shift by different parties—the newly sworn-in president purposely imprinted the mark of his own on the policy because he has attacked the policy of the incumbent president. For example, when Reagan expressed he would abide by the two communiqué in his China policy, he stated time again the America would not forget “the old alliance”—Taiwan . Clinton’s China policy was very tough in his first-term Administration because he has been attacking the Senior Bush “coddling dictators from Bagdad to Beijing.” The Junior Bush tried to define Sino-US relations as “strategic competitors ” or “strategic competitor, economic partners” because he has laughed at Clinton’s China policy as “constructive strategic partnership.”（3）Presidential shift from one party to another party always brings change into White House decision-making. Democratic presidents tend to democratize in foreign decision-making process. That is to say, different branches fall into internal turmoil in the process of competing for influences. For example, the conflict between Secretary of State Vance and NSC advisor Brzezinski during Carter Administration, and the Secretary of State Christopher and NSC advisor Anthony Lake. However, Republican presidents seek to centralize the leadership in foreign policy making. Even policy differences cannot become an obstacle to the foreign policy practice. For example, Nixon was partial to the NSC advisor Henry Kissinger when he was competing with Secretary of State Rogers. And George W. Bush is more close to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld when he disagreed with Secretary of State Powell. During the era of cold war (1972—1990), the international frame with two superpowers eyes for eyes has not changed fundamentally, Sino-US relations was affected obviously. Different presidents have different views of China. From the strategic needs, Nixon actively pushed Sino-US Relations moving ahead, agreeing to build liaisons office in both capitals. He had hoped to accomplish normalizations in his second term. His view of China was “ A peaceful independent China is in the traditional interest of America.” But he resigned because of Watergate Affair and vice President Ford succeeded him. Since President Ford was not elected into White House, his political base was very thin. And his decision to pardon Nixon was not popular. Under this circumstance, he has no capability to push forward the Sino-US Relations despite of his desire to follow Nixon’s China Policy. Although Carter Administration admitted that “ a strong safe and peaceful China is in the interest of World peace” ，Carter himself did not handle China policy harshly. In his first year, Carter relied on Secretary of State Vance, who tried to balance US Soviet policy and China policy and put the former on the priority. The result was the retreat of Sino-US relations. In his second year, Carter depended on NSC advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in the China policy, who emphasized on the importance of the China in the security and strategy issues. On the December 15, 1978，China and the United States published the Joint Communiqué by tabling the differences of both on Taiwan issue. Both sides acknowledge each other and built diplomatic relations since Jan. 1, 19979. In the campaign politics Reagan made a lot of pro-Taiwan speeches, he actually took “Track-Two” policy toward China although he did not want to spoil the strategic relationship with China and even regarded China as “a friendly non-allied country,” trying to improve the quality and quantity of the arms sale to Taiwan. After meeting Chinese fierce opposition, Reagan administration issued the Joint Communiqué with China on August 17, 1982. Since then, Sino-US relations developed smoothly during the remaining era of Regan Administration. In 1984，Reagan administration said, “a strong stable, constantly modernized in economic and developing relations with main industrialized democratic countries” may become an increasing power to the peace 。 During the post-cold war era, the Sino-US Relationship is distinctly affected by the Power Shift increasingly in the context of the international framework of “ One Superpower and several great powers.” In 1989, George H. Bush, personally inclined toward China expressed his good will to develop relations with China by put visiting Beijing soon after he was sworn in White House. It seemed to be against the cycle of Sino-US relations. But after a while, the change of China factors and international factors drag his leg and put the US China policy into a very complex position. Bush’s policy fell into the traditional track. He himself wisely vetoed the preconditions added on China’s MFN by Congress for three years, but for the purpose of politics, he was the first leader to express to impose sanctions on China among the western countries after the accident of Tian’Anmen. He was also the first President who violated two of three Communiqué s between China and the U.S. In the presidential campaign of 1992, he ratified the GE to sell 150 F-116 airplanes to Taiwan, directly against the Communiqué of 1982, which he committed to reach then. Meanwhile, he agreed that Trade Representative of America Carla Hills should visit Taiwan to negotiate with his counterpart on trade deficit, which broke a traditional policy of not allowing senior officials to visit Taiwan America has kept for many years. And it is also against the spirit of the Communiqué of Normalization. Thus, the old friend “Senior Bush” set a bad example in US China Policy. Clinton’s US China policy was strongly affected by the power shift: in his first term, Clinton’s foreign policy making was shadowed in the electoral politics lacking in the experience. He aggressively attacked former president’s China policy in the election campaign, so that he decided to adopt an unaccommodating policy different from that of George H. Bush after he took office. In 1993, he linked human rights issue with MFN. Because of the failure, he declared to give up this linkage policy in 1994. Meanwhile, he declared that the U.S. expand the scope of official ties with Taiwan in September of 1994.In 1995, he agreed to issue the visa to Lee Tenghui. At the coming end of the first term, he began to develop a comprehensive and strategic relation with China. After he succeeded in reelection in 1996, he helped in promoting the official summits between the Chinese president and the American president in both countries. At this time his view of China changed a lot, from China being “on the wrong way of history” to China being “at crossroad” to “a safe stable open and prosperous China” being in the interest of America. He even expressed the hope to build “ a constructive strategic relationship” between China and the United States and made a speech of “three no’s” policy on Taiwan . In the last year of his administration, he actively lobbied Congress to grant PNTR to China and succeeded . Clinton was regarded as “pro-Taiwan” at the beginning of his presidency, but when he was going to leave, he was termed as “pro-China”. In terms of US China policy, Clinton was the president who grew up in the presidency.。The flipping-flopping of Clinton’s US China policy fundamentally resulted from the changing of political situations but it also resulted from his personality. He was a punctilious and random man. And his decision-making was tagged as no priority and no purpose. In Clinton US China policy-making, he paid more attention to his approval rate in the polling and the weather of public opinion than to the substance of the policy itself. Thus what his flexibility shown was his expediency as a political animal. In 2001, George W. Bush became 43rd president of the United States without winning the plurality of the popular vote after the legal contest and involvement of Supreme Court. Although the foreign policy including US China policy has not been the debate topic since 1992, George W. Bush tried to redefine the Sino-US relations for the sake of showing the differences between Republicans and Democrats. He said: “We welcome a free and prosperous China”, and but now “ China is a competitor, not a strategic partner,” “We must deal with China without ill-will, but without illusions”, “we will help Taiwan defend itself.” As soon as George W. Bush took over the power, he reiterated the remarks and speeches he made in the campaign, and gradually changed “the strategic ambiguity” policy into the “strategic clarity”, that is, China cannot use force on Taiwan, “All issues concerned with Taiwan must be solved by peace and get the permission of the people living in Taiwan. If China violates these principles, US will make response according to US-Taiwan Relations Act. The U.S. will help Taiwan defend itself.” Even after the accident of Septem/11, America needed China’s help in building international anti-terrorism coalition; George W. Bush did not made basic adjustment in his China policy. Careful observers noticed that Bush seldom referred to “One China” policy, but more frequently emphasized that America will abide by the commitments made in US-Taiwan Relations Act. Up to now, his China policy seemed inclined toward Taiwan. For examples, America allowed Chen Shuibian’s overnight stop in New York when he went Latin America. The “Secretary of Defense ” of Taiwan was invited to visit the counterparts in the United States. American arms-sales to Taiwan got historical breakthrough either in quality or in quantity. Until recently, one and a half years later, Bush administration began to express that America opposes independence of Taiwan and will continue to support “one China” policy. It seems to indicate that George W. Bush’s China policy began to return on the normal track after a period of deviation. From the angle of personality, President Bush was an arbitrary and centralized man. Up to today, he relied the conservatives in his cabinet who were rich in experience of making foreign policy, such as vice president Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfwitz and NSC advisor Condoleezza Rice. These cold war hawks are inclined to stress the importance of security and they are sympathetic toward Taiwan. No wonder his China policy originally deviated from the former Sino-US framework. We conclude from the explanations made above, presidential power shift has been a cycling variant in Sino-US relations, which makes bilateral relations ups and downs at times. Because of the cycle of electoral politics, when a new president comes into power, he always inclines to show the differences of policy, distinguished from the former president. This is done out of the purpose of keeping the promise made in the campaign and rewarding the supporters and consolidating his political base. It is done also for the sake of clarifying his political ideas. Generally speaking, the first year can be termed as “the intern year,” particularly for a new president who lacks in the diplomatic experience and cannot understand the complex of Sino-US relations. He has not been familiar to the presidency and has not cherished the confidence and capability to master the situations. The second and third years can be called “the window of opportunity” to improve the relations between China and the U.S. During the period, the new president feels at home in the White House and has accumulated some sense through the summits. Now that his appointees have filled the positions, he has access to the information necessary to the decision-making. He then has a leeway power in handling the foreign policy. In the fourth year of the term, the president has become “lame duck” and he has fewer resources to take the risky and aggressive maneuver. The president who wants to campaign for the reelection sometimes makes “irrational” policy. As the head of the political party, he must defend status quo of the policy, and try to leave nothing wrong for the challenging party to blame. For a new president, it takes time to make a sound policy beneficial for both nations. It took 18 months for Carter and Reagan severally to do so. It even cost Clinton five-and-half year to do so . George W. Bush has spent 18 months and his China policy seems to have begun to be back to the normal track. Because of the limit of the presidential terms and the electoral cycle, the opportunity left for president is also limited. The presidential power shift—whether it belongs to same-party-power-shift or different-party-power-shift, it always put into the cycling important factor in the US China policy-making—leadership. The party identification, political ideas, the policy attachments, personality and political style of the president, will have great impact on the decision-making of foreign policy. The Congressional Power Shift: the Disturbing Factor in US China Policy According to the U.S. Constitution, Congress does not dominate in foreign policy or US China policy-making, but it exerts influences on the making of foreign policy. The degree or the extent of this kind of influences varies from era, issue or area, and president. As to the era, Congress did not play very important role in foreign policy during the cold war because dealing with the threat of security overwhelmingly fell into the hand of president. But in the post-cold war era, Congress exerts increasing influences. As to the issues, Congress is relevant to the foreign trade policy or ideological issues but irrelevant to the security issues. As to the man (president), the congresspersons’ support for the president from their same party is usually much higher than for the president form different party. Thus under the concerted party government, the president is checked by Congress less, but under divided government, the government is obstructed more by Congress. But we must take into issues account. On the free trade issue or granting MFN/NTR/PNTR, the big obstacle the democratic president met is not from the Republican congresspersons but from the democratic congresspersons. Because of the historic background ，"comparing with other bilateral relations between America and other countries, Congress has big impact on the Sino-US relations.” The issues Congress is concerned go beyond economic and trade issues (intellectual property, trade deficit, dumping and anti-dumping), expanding to the security issues (Taiwan issues, arms proliferations, NMD), human rights issues (political dissidents, family planning, religious freedom, Fa’lungong, Dalai lama and Tibet) and environmental protections, etc. Congress nearly involves into all contentious issues in Sino-US relations. The degree or the extent varies from the congressional power shift. The Congressional power shift can be divided into two types from the framework: House power shift and Senate power shift. House power shift can be separated into two kinds: same-party-power-shift (the majority party is the same, but the House speaker or the majority leader/ whip or the chairpersons of the committees and subcommittees have been replaced) and different-party-power-shift (the majority party changed and the House speaker, majority leader/whip and all chairpersons of committees and subcommittees replaced by the different party members. 1952-1994，the House power shift took place in the democratic party. In 1995, the power shift occurred from the Democratic members to the Republican members. Ever since 1995, the power shift was done among the Republican members. The case in Senate was similar to the House, but the power shift between two great political parties was more frequent than that in the House: 1972-1980，the leadership in the Senate going on among the Democratic Senators; in 1981, the leadership being taken over by the Republican Senators; 1981-1987, the leadership taking place among the Republican Senators; in 1987, Democratic Senators retaking the power; 1987-1995, the power shift taking place among the democratic Senators；in 1995 the power shift turning to the Republican Senators; 1995-2001, the leadership shifting among the Republican Senators; in 2001, the power shift returning back in the hands of Democratic Senators. Noticeably, Congressional power shift between different political parties are meaningful. Firstly, ideological orientation is changing, Democratic members tending toward liberal tide whereas Republican members inclining toward conservative trend. Secondly, it will result in the change of the legislative agenda and priority. Thirdly, now that different interest groups will bandwagon different party, the influences of interest groups severally will rise and fall as the power shift take place. For example, when the Democratic party is the majority of the House or the Senate, the Labor Union, Human Rights Organizations, and Environmental Protection Groups will voice big in House or in the Senate. On the contrary, when Republican party comes to the power, the military-industry groups, Industry and Business Groups, Christian Groups will be more influential. The influences of Congressional power shift on the Congressional decision-making follow as: (1) the personality of the Congressional leaders. Among the four types of Congresspersons, positive legislators and negative propagandist from competitive districts tend to do something whatever his/her purpose, and positive by-standers and negative reluctant members from the uncompetitive districts do not actively participate in the decision-making. (2) A member’s activity in the Congress is limited by many factors:：the districts (his voting percentage and the approval rate at this moment, high approval rate offers the member a great advantage in activity), his political party (majority or minority, the member of majority enjoys more resources and organizations), the seniority (whether he/she is a junior member in House less than 6 years, or senior members in house more than 20 years, or between both, Senior members familiar to the legislative process and cautious), the personality/home style, etc. (3) Cycling elections once every two years not only change the composition of the political parties, but also change the composition of the member’s ideology, region and interest. Even cycling elections does not change the composition of the political parties, it can have an impact on the Congressional decision-making because of the shifts. (4) The more percentage of the new members account for in the Congress, the more radical legislation passed. For example, 55 new members were elected in the midterm election of 1974 and among them 43 were Democratic. In the midterm election of 1994, 60 new members were elected and among them 52 members were Republican. （5）When the junior members accounts for more than half, the legislation passed will go radical because they have not learned the compromise and fully understand the complexities. For example, in the House, the junior members accounted for 50% (219 seats) of the 95th of Congress in 1977, for 51% (219 seats) of the 96th in 1979 and 51% (220 seats) of 104th of Congress in 1995, for 56% (243 seats) of the House of Congress in 1997. In Senate, the junior members accounted for 48% of the 96th Congress and for 55% of the 97th Congress in 1981. （5）Some chairpersons of committees and subcommittees related to the foreign affairs are more important than other chairpersons of committees and subcommittees in foreign policy making, such as the chairpersons of the international relations committee and subcommittee of Asian-Pacific affairs of the House and the chairpersons of foreign relations committee, intelligence committee and military committee of the Senate. The replacement of these Chairpersons will inevitably influence the Congressional foreign policy making. In the past 30 years, Congress usually played an active role in pushing economic trade relations between two countries, but it played a negative role on Taiwan issues and Human rights issues. The case is the Taiwan Relations Act. Many scholars noticed that Taiwan Relations Act was the result of the branch politics and interest groups politics. But few looked at it from the angle of the power shift. Now that junior members in the 96th Congress（1979-1981）accounted for more than half of the body, the legislation tended to go radical. The chairperson John Sparkman was replaced by four-term Senator Frank Church. In 1979, presidential power fell to the bottom owing to the Water Gate affair and Congressional power relatively resumed. New Congress was inclined to Taiwan obviously. During the debate on the US China policy, the mainstream of the Congressional did not oppose building diplomatic relations but emphasized on continuing to keep the security commitments to Taiwan and to safeguard the welfare of the people in Taiwan. The member of the foreign relations committee included some members of “Lobbying China Group” such as Barry Goldwater from Arizona and Jesse Helms from North Carolina, who proposed to “enliven” Mutual Defense Treaty Between America and Taiwan. Even some moderate Republicans such as Robert Dole required that the U.S. safeguard the security of Taiwan and any attacking Taiwan from the mainland be prohibited. In the House international relations committee, some pro-Taiwan Republican members tried to resume Mutual Defense Treaty in some form with others. At last, President Carter reached compromise with the Democrat-controlled Congress: Carter signed H. R. 2479 into the law. That is Taiwan Relations Act. And Congress helped the practice of the normalizations of Sino-US relations. From the legislative politics then, Taiwan Relations Act was the best thing that Carter could probably get to improve the bilateral relations. However, the latter facts have proven that Taiwan Relations Act has been the biggest obstacle that prevented Sino-US relations from moving forward. Lee Ten Hui’s visit to the U.S. was another example. According to the Joint Communiqué of 1979. After building diplomatic relations with People’s Republic of China, the U.S. has to keep unofficial relations with Taiwan. All the administrations after Carter voluntarily have limited the levels and frequency of the official exchanges between America and Taiwan until the end of the cold war. In 1992, so-called “old friend” of the Chinese people George H. Bush did not care about Chinese sensitivity and reaction on Taiwan. The USTR was sent to Taiwan to negotiate with his counterpart and met by Lee Tenghui. In 1993, the additional article entitled Taiwan Relations Act Revision of the State Department Authority Act of Fiscal Year 1994-1995 was passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton. The revision of Taiwan Relations Act rules that Taiwan Relations Act is prior to the policy statement, including the communiqués and orders, etc and the U. S. arms-sale to Taiwan will be adjusted according to Chinese military capabilities and intentions. In September of 1994, the State Department issued the adjustment of US Taiwan policy, agreeing to the renaming of the Taiwan’s branch in America，raising the levels of official exchanges, permitting deputy secretaries of economic and trade department to visit Taiwan, not allowing the top leaders (president, vice president, foreign secretary and defense secretary) of Taiwan to visit America. On May 22, 1995，President Clinton ratified to issue the visa to Lee Teng Hui. Just before the decision, the officials of State Department guaranteed that Lee Teng Hui would not be allowed to visit America either personally or officially. At last, China felt rebelled and responded by the missile exercise in the Taiwan straits. The Clinton’s decision partly mirrored his lack in understanding the importance and sensitivity of Taiwan issue in Sino-US relations and partly was the direct result of the Congressional pressures and influences: In the 104th Congress, the power shifted from Democratic party to the Republican party. The most of the Republican leaders were extremely conservatives from the Southern Sates: In the House, the Speaker was Newt Gingrich from Georgia. The majority leader was Dick Army from Texas and the Republican whip was Tom Delay from Texas. The chairman of the international relations was pro-Taiwan member Ben Gilman form New York state, replacing the moderate Democratic Lee Hamilton from Indiana. In the Senate, the majority leader was Robert Dole from Kansas. The Republican whip was Trent Lott from Mississippi and the Chairman of foreign relations was anti-China Jesse Helms, taking place of moderate Democrat Joseph Byden form Delaware. And in the early February of 1995，Gingrich and Helms expressed that they welcomed Lee Teng Hui to visit the U.S. And they supported Taiwan to join United Nations. Gilman and other members of Congress wrote to President, requiring revising the act of limiting Lee’s visit. On May 2 of 1995，the House passed a resolution concertedly, permitting Lee to visit the U.S. On May 9 of 1997, the Senate passed the similar resolution overwhelmingly with 97 votes for and 1 vote against Lee’s visit. Immediately afterward, the House international relations committee passed Taiwan Relations Act Revision Bill, ruling that the article of arms-sale to Taiwan was prior to the Sino-US Joint Communiqué of Aughust/17. On May 17, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed the similar revision bill 。Although the resolutions has not legal efficacy, it put a huge pressure on the White House and State Department. Two days later, the spokesman changed the tone, not saying that Lee’s visit would not be “inappropriate and improbable” but saying the problem “being considered and studied ” and “remaining to be decided” . Three days later, Clinton finally made an historic erroneous decision. Some argue that Lee’s visit was certain result from American adjustment of policy and strengthening the relations with Taiwan after the end of Cold War. This argument acknowledges the change of international frame and the domestic situations in the U.S. , China and Taiwan, however it is not sound enough to explain why Clinton made this breakthrough at that moment. If we use the model of power shift, it will be distinct that this is a result of the comprehensive and complex struggling in the US China policy making: Clinton was not a strong but a weak president called “ minority president”. He won the plurality of the popular votes in1992. The 105th Congress was a strong Congress because the power shift taking place from the Democratic party to the Republican party. And the Republican has waited too long and wanted to be aggressive and initiative in legislation. Besides, Clinton was regarded to shoulder the part of the responsibility for the Democratic failures in the last midterm election. In 1995, either in partisan politics and branch politics, Democratic president Clinton was on the defensive side and Congressional leader Gingrich was on the offensive side. And Clinton still had to take reelection into account. Both from his personality and power contest between the executive branch and the legislative branch, Clinton was unwilling and unable to take risks of sacrifice of his political capital to resist the strong desire of the Congress. The Congressional power shift of 1995 was a revolution to some degree. Conservative pro-Taiwan Republican Congresspersons regained power and more than half of them were junior members who were not familiar to the international affairs. It was under this political context that the resolutions for Lee’s visit were passed overwhelmingly. Clinton is not a principled man and likes to follow the poll and public opinion. This is how and why the Lee’s visit came to the true. The Limits of the Models of Power Shifts As mentioned above, the decision-making of US China Policy is both complex and dynamic. The factors in US China policy are multi-levels. The models of power shifts are efficient in explanations only under the conditions that the big framework (such as international framework China’s factors and other factors) is unchanged. Even this efficacy is limited and we should be cautious to adopt these models. First，they can explain the reasons of the cycling ups-and-downs (particularly downs) in US China policy. They have not explained yet why US China policy could be back on the track after the pendulum of the power shifts. In the past, it owed to the common strategic interests between two nations. During the post-cold war era, it can be owing to the wide and paralleling interests such as economic trade benefits, anti-terrorism, preventing mass destructive weapons proliferation, striking the across-nation drug-smuggling, and safeguarding the peace of the Asia-Pacific region, etc. These are the facts that any power shifts cannot change. As Zbigniew Brzezinski said, America “admits the reality” 。Even when the frictions happened now and then during the Clinton Administration, the cooperation was much more than conflicts. Second，they reflect adjustments and changes in US China policy more than the continuity. If we look at the US China policy for a longer term, we can find that China policy has a tradition of continuity. For example, each administration publicly adopts “One China” policy but actually performed a kind of “track policy” on Taiwan issue America tries to balance its interest both in Mainland and in Taiwan. Americans aim at benefiting greatest from this policy without caring more about Chinese psychological attachment to the reunification of the across-strait peoples. On the economic trade issue, either Republican or Democratic administrations tend to develop economic and trade ties actively and assertively. Even during the post-cold war era, MFN/NTR/PNTR granted to China has been debated in the Congress every year and disturbed by partisan politics and interest groups politics, it succeeded every time. Third，they notice the differences of personality and decision-making processes between different leaders. But it omits the consensus on US China policy among the different branches, leaders, and the political parties. That is: There are deep differences in ideology, political institution and cultural values as well as the common interests. And the policy goal of the US China Strategy is to make China become a friendly and useful country, preventing China from rebelling or from challenging the leadership of the U.S. Fourth，the power shifts can change the form rather than the essence of the mechanism. The areas concerned with the framing issues such as common interests or stark divisions are not easily affected by the power shift. But the gray areas are influenced greatly by the power shifts. Conclusion Sino-US relationship is not normal relationship between two great major powers like others. It is easy enough to be succumbed to the influences of the cycling power shifts of America. Every new president seems not to be clear of what kind of Sino-US relationship and what kind of policy should be to deal with China. And every big Congressional power shift will involve into the processes of Sino-US relations seriously. Only after experiencing a period of exploration-test-response, American government can find out which is the priority it should focus. However, now that the cycling character of American electoral politics exists, the window of opportunity to make a sound US China policy is not open wide frequently. If a president cannot grasp the timing, the window of opportunity will close quickly. And it has to wait for a new cycle’s coming for the improvement of Sino-US relationship. The cycle of ups-and-downs in Sino-US Relations rhythms with the cycles of power shifts. The phenomenon roots into the complexity and uncertainty of bilateral relations, as well as into the systematic differences and institutional ambivalences. The frequency of the ups-and-downs rising shows that the consensus is reducing and divisions are increasing in US China policy making. And many factors involved into the decision-making reflect the domestic political development. Besides this, the media demonizing China plays an important role in shaping the negative impression of China of the average Americans. Any president cannot ignore or omit these factors. The power shifts are a challenge as well as an opportunity for the smooth development of Sino-US relationship. In the past 30 years, the negative sides immediately followed the power shift and the positives sides will appear after a long time. So some people take it for granted that if there were no power shift, Sino-US relations would have developed stably and smoothly. As a matter of fact, the developing model of Sino-US relations is different from other bilateral relations between the U.S. and other countries. It is not linear stable development, but spiral unstable development. After the power shift, president needs strategic vision and iron determination and good will and high approval rate when he is faced with a lot of options for US China policy-making. Although there are many participators in US China policy-making, president is still the last one to decide. Most congresspersons like to deliver the US China policy speeches as political show. In nowadays, bashing-China seems to invite some applause among the voters. The stubborn anti-China Congresspersons on all issues will become endangered species in the decision-making. The interest groups often offset one another (such as Labor Unions and Business Groups) on the one hand and coordinate together on the other hand (such as human rights groups, environmental protection groups, Christian Coalition Groups and Labor Unions on the issue of US China Human Rights policy). In the bureaucratic politics, State Department, Commence Department, Agricultural Department, Energy Department and US Trade Negotiation Office incline toward cooperation with China for business interests. The Department of Defense, CIA and other intelligence and security branch tend to be tough to China. The Labor Department, Environment Protection Agency and Immigration and Naturalization Office turn sour to China. In inter-branch politics, the president treats Sino-US Relations strategically, comprehensively and realistically. The Congress deals with Sino-US relations ideologically and negatively. Three established commissions and caucus----China Human Rights commission, China Security Commission and Taiwan caucus focus and keep watch on the knotted questions—human rights, security, and Taiwan issues in Sino-US relations. The power shifts are the mirror of the changed political reality. It is objective. The factor of the leadership in the models of power shifts is subordinate to the situations and the positions. It may be wise not to use the words like “pro-China” or “pro-Taiwan” in weighing US China policy. A smart political figure generally makes policy not from his likings or feelings but from the cool interests (his political calculations, his party electoral victory and national interest). As a famous English politician said, “there are no perpetual friends but perpetual interests” in international politics. In sum, when the situations are certain and clear, the power shifts will not have important impacts on the Sino-US relationship, whereas when the dust has not been set and the framework has not been established, Sino-US relations will change and become adrift with the power shifts in American politics. For any political leader, politics is the first priority. And actually the politics matters in the decision-making of US China policy. In the forthcoming years, the model of power shifts will probably remain to be partly effective in explaining Sino-US relations.